University of Mississippi

eGrove
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

2000

Comment Letters Re: Exposure Draft (ED 00-1) Deferral of
Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2
Independence Standards Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Independence Standards Board, "Comment Letters Re: Exposure Draft (ED 00-1) Deferral of Effective Date
of ISB Standard No. 2" (2000). Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams. 594.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc/594

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Association Sections, Divisions,
Boards, Teams by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact
egrove@olemiss.edu.

ISB

For Reference
Do Not Take
From the Library

Independence
Standards
Board

BOARD

William T. Allen, Chairman
Director
Centerfor Law and Business
New York University
John C. Bogle
Founder
The Vanguard Group

Stephen G. Butler, CPA
Chairman and CEO
KPMGLLP
Robert E. Denham
Partner
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP

Manuel H. Johnson
Co-Chairman and
Senior Partner
Johnson Smick
International, Inc.
Philip A. Laskawy, CPA
Chairman and CEO
Ernst & Young LLP

Barry C. Melancon, CPA
President and CEO
American Institute of CPAs
James J. Schiro, CPA
Chief Executive Officer
PricewaterhouseCoopers

Date: June 2, 2000

To:

Interested Parties

From: Art Siegel, Executive Director

Attached for your information and review is a copy of ISB ED 001, the purpose of which is to defer the original June 15, 2000
effective date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence
Implications ofAudits ofMutual Funds and Related Entities, until
60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove
conflicts with the Standard.

The Board would appreciate your responding to the one question on
the last page of the ED—“Is it appropriate to defer the proposed
effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing
rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the
Standard?” Please note that comments must be received by July 5,
2000.
Additional copies of the ED for your associates are available
directly from the ISB, or from our website,
www.cpaindependence.org .

STAFF

Arthur Siegel, CPA
Executive Director

Thank you for your interest in auditor independence issues and the
ISB.

Richard H. Towers, CPA
Technical Director
Susan McGrath, CPA
Director

William J. Cashin Jr, CPA, CFA
Director

Christine D. Bricker
Assistant Technical Director

1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775
(212) 596-6133 • fax (212) 596-6137
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org

To: < isb@cpaindependence.org >

Subject: EDOO-1

cc:

Alfred M. King, Chairman
Valuation Research Corporation

The delay of the effective date appears totally realistic. Having bits and pieces of rules, before the SEC decides, will only lead to confusion

06/10/00 02:22 PM

m>

"Alfred M. King"
< alfredking@erols.co

QUESTION FOR RESPONDENTS

Q1. Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No. 2
until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove Conflicts
with the Standard?

"philip lochner jr"
<plochner@worldnet.
att.net >

To: < Asiegel@cpaindependence.org>
cc:
Subject: ISB Standard No. 2

06/10/00 10:26 AM

Dear Art,
This is in response to yourJune 2memo. I believe it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB
Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the Standard.
Phil Lochner

Jun 12 2000

:

ISB
Robert L. Gray

:

r

"Robert L. Gray" To: ASiegel@cpaindependence.org, SMcgrath@cpaindependence.org
lgr ay4@juno.c om>
cc:
06/1 3/00 09: 01 PM
Subject: ISB ED 00-1 Response to June2, 2000 Memo

I

agree that it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of
ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are
modified to remove conflicts with the Standard.

Fr

To

—
—

To: SUSAN LANGE/NY/AICPA@AICPA
cc: Art Siegel/NY/AICPA@AICPA
Subject: ISB ED 00-1 Response to June2, 2000 Memo

Susan, can you log this in as a response? Thanks. Susan
Forwarded by Susan McGrath/NY/AICPA on 06/14/00 11:21 AM

06 /14/ 00 11 :2 8 AM

Susan McGrath

"Clarence Hein"

< CHEIN@heincpa.co

m>
06/19/00 08:33 AM

To: isb@cpaindependence.org
cc:
Subject: Memo dated June 2000

Regarding your question, "Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until
60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the Standard?"

My response is "YES".

Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
College Retirement Equities Fund
730 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017-3206

212 490-9000

1 800 842-2733

Richard L. Gibbs
Executive Vice President
(212)916-4900
(212)916-6230

Tel.
Fax

RGibbs@TlAA-CREF.ORG EMail

June 15, 2000

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re: ED00-1

Dear Sirs:
We believe it is reasonable and entirely appropriate to defer the proposed effective
date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to
remove conflicts with the Standard.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Gibbs
Executive Vice President
RLG/mc

Katch, Tyson & Company

JUN 1 9 2000
191

WAUKEGAN

ROAD

NORTHFIELD, ILLINOIS 60093-2726

(847) 446-3700

FAX

NO. (847) 446-7514

June 15, 2000

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Re:

ED 00-1

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to Exposure Draft 00-1,
Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2.
The exposure
draft defers the original June 15, 2000 effective date until sixty
days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to comply with
the Standard.
My objection is not with the deferral, but with the idea that the
deferral has no sunset.
It is dependent upon the SEC making the
necessary modifications.
What if the SEC, for whatever reason,
does not make the modifications until 2003.
Are we prepared to
wait until 2003?
I hope not.
I believe the deferral should have
an "the earlier of modification by the SEC or a date (December 31,
2000).

Sincerely,
KATCH, TYSON & COMPANY

Ronald S. Katch

RSK:tle

JUN-26-2000

14:40

KPMG LLP-DDP

280 Park Avenue

Telephone 212 909 5400

New York, NY 10017

Fax 212 909 5699

June 26,2000

JUN 2 6 2000

Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear Sirs:
Invitation to Comment [ED 00-1]
Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence
Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft [ED 00-1]: Deferral of
Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of
Mutual Funds and Related Entities. We agree with the proposal to defer the effective
date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to
remove conflicts with the Standard. In addition, we would also recommend a working
group be established to develop implementation guidance for ISB Standard No. 2.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this matter.
Very truly yours,

■■■■

TOTAL P.02

SEYFARTH
ATTORNEYS SHAW

1270 Avenue of the Americas
Suite 2500

New York, NY 10020-1801
212-218-5500

Writer's direct phone

(212)218-5507

fax 212-218-5526

Writer's e-mail
astanger@ny.seyfarth.com

www.seyfarth.com

The SEC has chosen to defer to the ISB in the area of setting independence standards but
nonetheless retains the ultimate responsibility and authority in that area and monitors the activities
of the ISB. Under these circumstances it is not appropriate for the ISB to issue a Standard which
conflicts with an existing SEC Standard until such time as the SEC repeals its conflicting Standard.
I thank you for this opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft and would be pleased to
discuss the subject matter of this letter with any members of the ISB or its staff.

Abraham M. Stanger

AMS.cac
NY1 25021297 v 1

SAN FRANCISCO
SACRAMENTO

NEW YORK

The SEC, under its governing statute, has responsibility and authority to prescribe financial
reporting and disclosure standards with respect to filings by those entities required to file periodic
reports with the SEC. The SEC also has responsibility and authority for regulating the conduct of
accountants who practice before the SEC. As part of the foregoing, the SEC has authority to
prescribe independence standards with respect to accountants performing audits and rendering
opinions on financial statements filed with the SEC. The SEC has exercised its powers described
above, to promulgate certain rules which are in conflict with the Exposure Draft.

LOS ANGELES

This letter is in response to your request for specific input on whether it is appropriate to
defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard #2 (the "Exposure Draft") until 60 days after
existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the Standard. The views expressed
in this letter are those of the undersigned and are not to be attributed to the law firm of which the
undersigned is a partner.

HOUSTON

Gentlemen:

CHICAGO

Exposure Draft: Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard #2

BOSTON

Re:

ATLANTA

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York NY 10036-8775

WASHINGTON, D.C.

BRUSSELS

June 22, 200C

To: isb@cpaindependence.org
cc:
Subject: Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2

C.

Russel Hansen, Jr., Managing Director

Thank you for soliciting our opinion on this matter.

BoardPros, LLC supports your deferral of the original June 15, 2000 effective
date of ISB Standard No. 2 as outlined in the June 2000 Exposure Draft and
for the reasons therein expressed.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

06/27/00 05.47 PM

Boardpros@cs.com

PM

To: isb@cpaindependence.org

Subject: ED 00-1

cc :

.

Susan S. Lightle, Ph.D., CPA, CIA
Department of Accountancy
Wright State University

I support the exposure draft.
I agree that implementation of ISB
Standard No. 2 prior to SEC modification of conflicting standards would
add unnecessarily to the existing complexity of regulations.

Entities

This e-mail message is in response to your request for comment on ED
00-1, Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain
Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related

06/30/00 12:29

t.edu >

Susan Lightle
< susan.lightle@ wrigh

AICPA

June 29, 2000

JUL

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

5 2000

Attn: ED 00-1
Gentlemen:

The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit this
comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 00-1, Deferral of
Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of
Mutual Funds and Related Entities.
We support the Board’s proposed standard which would defer the effective date of ISB
Standard No. 2 until 60 days after the SEC rules are revised. Specifically, we believe that
to require compliance with this standard prior to conforming changes to the SEC rules,
would only add to the complexity of the existing independence rules. We also believe
that the proposed 60 days is an appropriate time frame for requiring compliance.

We also recommend that the Board establish a working group to consider the need for
implementation guidance or an interpretation to deal with such issues, and the need to
conform ISB No. 2 more closely to the approach taken in the Financial Interests and
Family Relationships project.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in further
detail these comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s Exposure Draft.
Sincerely,

James L. Curry
Chair
PEEC

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • (201) 938-3000 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3329 • www.aicpa.org

ISO 9001 Certified
The

CPA. Never Underestimate The Value.®

Arthur Andersen

June 30, 2000
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Arthur Andersen LLP

225 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago IL 60601-7600
Tel 312 782 0225
Fax 312 507 2548

Re: ED 00-1
Gentlemen:

We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your request for comments on Exposure Draft (ED 00-1),
Deferral of Effective Date ofISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications ofAudits of Mutual
Funds and Related Entities.
We support the Board’s proposal to defer the effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after the
SEC’s existing rules are modified. We agree that it is appropriate to postpone implementation of the
standard until it and the SEC’s rules are aligned.

In addition, we recommend that the Board consider development of guidance to aid in implementation
and interpretation of the standard. Stated briefly below are a few issues we feel such guidance might
clarify.

1. Would the standard allow for any materiality considerations in determining which entities in the
complex must be restricted?
2. Additional guidance on the standard’s application to sub-advisers would be helpful.
3. While the intent of the standard seems to be the restriction of the financial interests of firms and
individuals, it is not clear how it should be applied to services provided to, or loans from, entities
within the complex that are not attest clients.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on ED 00-1. We would be happy to discuss the above should
you have any questions. Please feel free to contact Chuck Horstmann at 312-507-3071 or Jean Rothbarth
at 312-507-2827.

Sincerely,

TOTAL P.02

JUL

5 2000

QUESTION FOR RESPONDENTS
Q1.
Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard No.2
until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove Conflicts
with the Standard?
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Independence Standards Board
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Barbara Mendel Mayden

Nashville, TN
Frank R. Morris, Jr.

Columbus, OH

Re:

M. Peter Moser
Baltimore, MD

COUNCIL
R. Franklin Balotti
Wilmington, DE

Exposure Draft (ED 00-1) Deferral of Effective Date of ISB
Standard No. 2

Gentlemen:

Richard E. Cherin
Newark, NJ

Jean E. Harris
Phoenix, AZ

Alan S. Kaplinsky
Philadelphia, PA
Bruce A. Mann
San Francisco, CA
Pamela M. Dashiell

Boston, MA

Harry L. Henning
Columbus, OH
Hugh M. Ray, Jr.

Houston, TX
James F. Tune
Seattle, WA

Steven O. Weise
Los Angeles, CA
Mary Beth Clary
Naples, FL

David G. Heiman
Cleveland, OH

Charles E. McCallum
Grand Rapids, Ml
Margaret L. Milroy
Arlington, VA

John F. Olson
Washington, DC

We are writing on behalf of the Committee on Law and Accounting (the
“Committee”) of the Section of Business Law (the “Section”) of the American
Bar Association (the “ABA”) in response to your request ED 00-1 for comments
on whether it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB Standard
No. 2, Certain Independence Implications of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related
Entities (“ISB 2”), until 60 days after certain existing rules of the Securities
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are modified to remove conflicts with that
Standard. Although this letter lias been circulated among members of the
Committee and a majority of those who have responded have expressed their
general concurrence with the views we express in this letter, this letter does not
necessarily represent the views of all of the members of our Committee, the
Section or the ABA.

Deborah L. Fletcher
Charlotte, NC
James J. Hanks, Jr.
Baltimore, MD

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the issue raised in ED 00-1.

Thurston R. Moore

Richmond, VA

Karen L. Shapiro
Newark, NJ
Edwin Eric Smith

Boston, MA

BOARD OF GOVERNORS LIAISON
Philip S. Anderson
Little Rock, AK

UNG LAWYERS DIVISION LIAISONS
C. Elisia Frazier
Fort Wayne, IN
Rew R. Goodenow

Reno, NV

SECTION DIRECTOR
Candy L. Simons
Chicago, IL
(312) 988-5605
simonsc@staff.abanet.org

The SEC, under provisions of various statutes that it is charged with
administering, has the authority to require registration statements and reports
required to be filed with it pursuant to those statutes to include financial
statements audited by independent certified public accountants. The SEC has
adopted rules relating to the circumstances in which it will not recognize a
certified public account as independent and codified various of its interpretations
of those rules to supplement those rules.

Independence Standards Board
June 30,2000
Page 2
The ISB believes that certain of those rules and interpretations may
conflict with the provisions of ISB 2.
The SEC has permitted the ISB to set independence standards, but,
nonetheless, has retained the ultimate responsibility and authority in that area and
monitors the activities of the ISB.

Under these circumstances, we do not believe that it would be appropriate
for the SEC to continue in enforce rules that conflict with ISB 2 or any other ISB
standards that the SEC, in exercising its oversight over the ISB, has permitted to
take effect. We understand that, on June 27, 2000, the SEC authorized the
issuance of proposals for comment that would address this issue.
Accordingly, we believe it would be entirely appropriate and most
desirable for the ISB to defer the proposed effective date of ISB 2 until that
rulemaking is complete. We believe that were the Independence Standards Board
to do otherwise, independent auditors and their audit clients would be subject to
confusion as to what conduct affected the auditors independence. Were the SEC
to find judgments in this regard to be wrong, auditors might be unable to provide
audit services to clients and could be subject to SEC disciplinary proceedings.
Their clients could be subject to the consequences of not having their financial
statements in compliance with SEC requirements, including disruptions of
offerings of securities and other transactions. These would be unacceptable
results.
We reiterate our appreciation for the opportunity you have extended to our
Committee to comment on this important topic.

Richard H. Rowe, Chair
Committee on Law and
Accounting, Section of Business
Law, American Bar Association
Drafting Group:
Richard H. Rowe
Abraham M. Stanger

JUL-05-2000

N.

11:10

O. SEC SERVICES ANNEX

Ten Westport Road
P.O. Box 820
Wilton, Connecticut 06897-0820

Tel: (203)761 3000
www.us.deloine.com

JUL

5 2000

Deloitte
& Touche

July 5, 2000

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775

Re:

ED 00-1, Deferral of Effective Date of ISB Standard No. 2, Certain
Independence Implication of Audits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities

Dear Sirs:

We believe that it is appropriate to defer the proposed effective date of ISB
Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing SEC rules are modified to remove
conflicts with the Standard.

* * * * *

If you have any questions concerning our comments, please contact
Robert J. Kueppers at (203) 761-3579 or Richard M. Goligoski at (203) 761-3423.

Sincerely,

Deloitte
Touche
Tohmatsu
TOTAL P.02

MIKE GOMEZ
From:

MIKE GOMEZ

Sent:

Wednesday, July 05, 2000 3:21 PM

To:

’isb@cpaindependence.org'

Subject: Response to ED 00-1

Based on our review of ED 00-1, we feel that it is appropriate to defer the proposed
effective date of ISB Standard No. 2 until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are
modified to remove conflicts with the Standard.

Michael J. Gomez
Deputy Auditor General

State of Florida Auditor General
111 West Madison Street
Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1450

Phone: (850)487-4998
Fax:
(850)414-7488

07/05/2000

PRICEWATeRHOUSECOOPERS
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NewYork NY 10036
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addressee is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediatelyby telephone, and mail the
original to us at the above address.

Message:

PRICEWATeRHOUSCOOPERS

July 7,2000

Mr. Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel:

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is pleased to submit comments1 on the Independence
Standards Board’s (ISB or Board) Exposure Draft (ED) 00-1, Deferral ofEffective Data
ofISB Standard No. 2, Certain Independence Implications ofAudits ofMutual Funds and
Related Entities.

Below is our response to die question contained in the ED.
Question 1: Is it appropriate to defer the proposed effective date ofISB Standard No. 2
until 60 days after existing rules of the SEC are modified to remove conflicts with the
Standard?
We believe that deferral is appropriate. Piecemeal adoption of the standard would only
serve to increase the complexities and confusion associated with it, some of which we
describe below. More importantly, in light of the SEC’s recent proposed amendments to
the independence rules, we think ISB 2 should be deferred until it is clear how the
amendments will affect this area. In our view, it is important that the ISB be in synch
with the SEC in this area, particularly to avoid multiple rule changes in a short period of
time.
Once the ISB has a clear indication of where the SEC is headed in its rulemaking and
how that rulemaking will impact the matters covered by ISB 2, we suggest that the Board
1 The comments in this letter have been developed from the perspective of our firm as an ISB constituent. As y»»u
know, PwC's chief executive officer, James J. Schiro, is a member of the ISB. In carrying out his responsibilities as a
board member, Mr. Schiro intends to fully exercise objectivity with a view to helping the ISB to reach conclusions on

this project that are in the best interests of independence standard-setting and the investing public. The comments in
this letter have been developed consistent with that goal but should not be viewed as necessarily indicative of Mr
Schiro’s personal views and do not serve to bind him in any particular thought process in his role as an ISB member.

Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6,2000
Page 2 of9
consider the following matters before allowing ISB 2 to become effective. These matters
involve implementation difficulties that we have identified to date, including 1SB staff
positions that we believe go beyond the restrictions intended by the Board.

The re-examination and subsequent amendment by a standard setter of a recently issued
standard occurs from time to time when the need to do so is perceived to be significant
For example, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has re-examined
certain of its standards to appropriately deal with implementation issues. Last month the
FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 138, Accounting
for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities, an amendment of
FASB Statement No. 133, to address certain implementation difficulties in applying SFAS
No. 133, Accountingfor Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, which was
issued in June 1998 and had an effective date of June 15, 1999. Further, the FASB staff
has issued a number of guidebooks lu provide implementation guidance un various
accounting standards. These measures reflect the fact that the FASB cannot anticipate
and address all of the implementation questions that might arise fur a particular standard
when it is issued. Because the ISB cannot either, we think it is appropriate for the Board
to re-examine ISB 2 now for the matters described in this letter. Moreover, based on
comments made by the SEC’s chief accountant during the Board's May 1,2000 meeting
(i.e., that he has received requests from several of the accounting firms for the SEC staff
to address issues arising from ISB 2), it appears that other firms may also have
implementation issues. We suggest the Board identify and address those issues as well to
ensure that its first standard imposing independence restrictions on auditors appropriately
matches restrictions with threats and properly reflects the Board’s intent.

The comments that follow pertain to the following areas:

•
•
•
•
•

Application of materiality
Requirement tn be independent vs. a restriction on investing
Definition of a mutual fund complex
Those in a position to influence the audit
Definition of a mutual fund

Application of Materiality

We agree with the provision in footnote. 2 of the standard that provides for the use of
materiality in determining whether an auditor of a mutual fund should adhere to
investment restrictions with respect to the non-client parent of the fund's outside
investment adviser (i.e., an adviser that is not part of the mutual fluid complex) and to the
non-client subsidiaries of the non-client parent. The use of materiality in such cases
appropriately matches any investment restriction to the corresponding level of
independence threat. We have been advised by the ISB staff that materiality cannot be

Mr. Arthur Siegel
July 6, 2000
Page 3 of 9

used, however, in determining whether investment restrictions should apply to non-client
entities (parents and their subsidiaries) that are within the mutual fund complex. We arc
puzzled by this.
First, the wording in footnote 2 can easily be interpreted as allowing the application of
materiality in cases involving non-dient parents of advisers within the fund complex. In
fact, that is how we interpret the footnote.

Second, in our view there is no conceptual basis to support prohibiting the use of
materiality merely because the non-client entities are inside the fund complex rather than
outside. The independence threats that arise from a mutual fund/parem company
relationship are not dependent upon whether the related investment advisor is inside or
outside the fond complex; rather, the threats depend on whether the relationship between
the mutual fund and the parent is material. If the Board believes there is a basis to
support the prohibition of materiality in these situations, it should state the rationale for it.
in the Basis for Conclusions, especially since this matter was raised during the comment
process.

Further, prohibiting the use of materiality in such situations would result in the
application of restrictions that go well beyond the potential independence threats. Even if
an auditor audits only one mutual fond and even if that fund is de minimis to the
investment adviser and its upstream parent entities, the auditor would be prohibited from
investing in any of the non-client parents and any of their subsidiaries. We do not see
how such a broad restriction benefits the auditor's independence of the mutual fond. For
example, say a non-client bank has a subsidiary font wholly owns another subsidiary that
itself wholly owns an entity that is foe investment adviser to a group of mutual funds.
Based on advisory fees paid by the funds, they are immaterial to all of the upstream
entities. Under ISB 2, as clarified for us by the ISB staff, the auditor of the funds would
be deemed not independent of those funds if he, his firm, or those in foe firm who are in a
position to influence the audit had an investment in any of the upstream entities including
the top-tier non-client bank. But change the facts slightly and make the investment
advisor an entity that is outside of the fund complex, and such an investment would be
permissible. This goes against common sense. We see no incentive for the auditor to be
less than objective during the conduct of the fund audit in either scenario. The result also
is inconsistent with the general notion of applying materiality in mvestor/investee
situations, which we see as analogous.

Section 602.02.b.iii of foe SEC’s Codification of Financial Reporting Policies permits the
use of materiality in determining whether an auditor could invest in a non-client investor
or investee2. In the discussion m Section 602.02.h.iii, if the non-client investee is
2 We were advised by the SEC staff several years ago that the discussion in Section 602.02.b.iii was not meant to
exclude s
ituations in which the investor is the non client; i.e., Materiality would apply in both non-client investor/client
investee and non-client investee/client investor situations.
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immaterial to the client investor, members are permitted to invest in the non-client
investee3. Investors and investees arc often equated with parents and subsidiaries4, as
well as entities where ownership is less than fifty percent and control may or may not
exist between the entities. The Board has concluded that "the typical mutual fund/adviser
relationship is not that of a subsidiary/parent" (paragraph 14 of ISB 2). Among the
reasons for this conclusion is the fact that there is no majority ownership or voting
control between the adviser and the mutual fund. Accordingly, such relationships should
be viewed as analogous to non-controlling (rather than controlling) investor/investee
situations.

We believe that a materiality test should be applied in evaluating all mutual fund-parent
company relationships, not just those in which the fund’s investment adviser is outside of
the mutual fund complex. We encourage the Board to specifically address this issue to
ensure that 1) the restrictions arc proportional to the related independence threats, and 2)
the restrictions provide a commensurate benefit to the investing public.
Requirement to be independent vs. a restriction on investing

This project arose in response to questions about whether an auditor of one or more
mutual funds could invest in non-client sister funds and whether an audit firm could audit
one or more funds in a fund family while its pension assets were invested in non-client
hinds in the same fund family. From the beginning of this project, we viewed these to be
the issues that the Board was addressing. We believe this is what the Board thought it
was addressing as well, in fact, the second sentence of paragraph 1 of ED 99-1. Certain
Independence Implications ofAudits of Mutual Funds and Related Entities, states, in part:
The primary issues arc whether knowledgeable and reasonable investors believe
that (a) investments by certain partners of an audit firm in non-client funds within
a mutual fund complex, or (b) investments through an employee benefit plan by
the spouses and dependents of such partners in client mutual funds create
conflicting interests that compromise the credibility of the auditor's reports on the
financial statements of the entities it audits.

Other areas of ED 99 1 confirm the focus on investments and the Board's
acknowledgement of this. For example, Question 1 of the ED states:
The Board's proposal proscribes investments in non-audit client sister funds...
As a result, the proposal will permit investments in such other funds by all other
partners.
3 The investment would have to be immaterial to their net worth.
4 For example, AICPA Ethics Interpretation 101-8, which also contains materiality tests to determine investment
eligibility in non-clients, defines "investor" to include a parent company
"investee" to include a subsidiary
company.
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The discussions in the Basis for Conclusions of ISB 2 further confirm this understanding.
All of those discussions center on investment restrictions and the reasons for the Board
prescribing them in certain cases and not requiring them in others.

Unfortunately, certain parts of ISB 2 characterize the required investment restrictions
simply as a requirement to be independent The ISB staff has interpreted that
characterization, which we think was inadvertent, as requiring independence beyond
investment restrictions. This has broad implications, especially for the audit firms
themselves. It precludes not only investments in non-client entities, but any other
relationships with those entities if such relationships would be precluded in connection
with an audit client. Thus, under the staff’s interpretation, firms would be precluded from
rendering certain non-audit services (e.g., bookkeeping services) to non-client entities
within the fund complex, even if the entity is a remote non-client subsidiary of the toplevel non-client parent. This may also mean that firms would be unable to cuter into a
business relationship with one of the non-client entities and would have an independence
issue if a family member of an individual on the audit team held a position of importance
with one of the non-client entities or a former partner of the firm took a responsible
position with one of those entities. These conclusions are difficult to justify when nonclient entities are involved, especially if those entities arc several tiers removed from the
audit client mutual fund or other non-fund client entity.
We strongly recommend that the Board consider whether the staff's interpretation reflects
the Board's intentions. If it does, the Board should carefully consider the implications of
such broad restrictions before ISB 2 becomes effective, especially whether such
restrictions are proportional to the independence threats. We suggest that the Board first
analyze whether there would be an independence threat when a firm renders certain non
audit services to a non-client entity in the complex or utilizes the normal and customary
products or services (such as lending facilities or brokerage accounts) of one of those
non-clients. Making such an analysis while mindful of the fact that the entities are not
audit clients, and in view of the Board's conclusions about the organizational structure of
a mutual fund complex, we conclude that there would be little, if any, threat to a firm’s
independence in respect of the audit client within the complex. For example, utilizing
Appendix A of ISB 2, we believe that the auditor of the mutual fund would not have an
incentive to be less than objective during the audit just because his firm is providing
bookkeeping services to the non-client trust company or to the non-client parent holding
company. Add to this the fact that the audit clients may be immaterial to the upstream
entities and, per footnote 2, the independence restriction runs even to entities outside the
fund complex, and we think it is evident that the broad independence requirement goes
well beyond the threats posed by such relationships.
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Please take this opportunity to address this important issue and ensure that the
requirements of ISB 2 are in proportion to the independence threats that arise from
various relationships.

Definition of Mutual Fund Complex
ISB 2 defines a mutual fund complex as “the mutual fund operation in its entirety,
including all the funds, plus the sponsor, its ultimate parent company and their
subsidiaries.” We have been advised by the ISB staff that despite this definition, any and
all entities that are underneath the ultimate parent - even if they are not part of the
operation of the mutual funds - would be considered to be part of the mutual fund
complex, We question whether this is what the Board intended, especially if the
requirement is to be independent ofsuch entities rather then simply not invest in them. It
would mean that a manufacturing subsidiary of a parent that is, for example, well off to
the left of the entities listed in Appendix A of ISB 2 would need to be considered part of
the mutual fund complex. So would entities that arc involved in retail operations, high
technology, entertainment, etc. It is not unusual for many large conglomerates to have
multiple lines of business such as these, in addition to a stable of mutual funds and other
financial services products.

We believe the staff's interpretation goes beyond what is necessary to protect the
independence of the auditor of a mutual fund or other non-fund entity. While it is
possible that (he Board intended to sweep into the definition of a mutual fund entities that
are financial services entities, such as those listed in Appendix A and included in the
definition of "non-fund entity,” it is difficult to understand how relationships with entities
that have nothing co do with the operation of a mutual fund and are not even financial
service entities can threaten the independence of the auditor of a mutual fund. We ask
that the Board consider whether extending investment restrictions (or a broader
independence requirement) to those outlying entities is truly necessary to protect the
auditor's independence with respect to audit client mutual funds and related non-fund
entities.
Those in a Position to Influence the Audit
The definition of “those in a position to influence the audit” is in need of a practical limit
to who might be included in this category, especially for large firms where hundreds of
individuals could be swept into this category depending on how one interprets it
The phrase "those who supervise or have direct management responsibility for... the
partners and staff members involved in the audit" could mean only those individuals
assigned to the audit engagement in question plus their direct reports who are specific to
that engagement For example, the partner on the audit of XYZ mutual fund may, in a
large firm, report to a regional mutual fund industry leader who reports to a regional
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financial services line of service lender who reports to a national financial services line of
service leader who reports to the firm's CEO. One interpretation is that all four additional
partners would be subject to ISB 2 with respect to the non-client sister funds of XYZ.
However, if the partner on XYZ works in more than one industry, it is unclear whether
any of the partners in the other industry (to whom this partner reports) would be swept
into the definition simply because they have direct management responsibility for the
partner through his other industry involvement Further, if a human resources partner
participates in the XYZ audit partner's performance evaluation or the setting of his or her
compensation, it is unclear whether that would be viewed as the type of direct
management responsibility that would cause the human resources partner to be subject to
ISB 2. Also uncertain is whether the partners who comprise a firm’s governing board (or
equivalent group), which could be argued to have management responsibility for the
entire firm, would be subject to ISB 2.

Non-partner professionals raise similar issues. For example, assume that a manager on
the XYZ mutual fund audit works on five other audit engagements - none of which are
subject to ISB 2. Are the partners to whom the manager reports on those engagements
subject to ISB 2 in connection with the XYZ fund complex simply because they
supervise and have direct responsibility for that manager - albeit on other engagements?
If so, would the partners to whom those engagement partners report also be subject to
ISB 2? We believe the answers to these questions should be no and we suggest that the
Board clarify this to aid in the consistent application of this provision. The inclusion of
examples in ISB 2 would also be helpful and we would be happy to work with the ISB
staff to develop them.

ISB 2 also provides that the person in charge of a firm's consulting department may not
be “recused” and therefore would always be subject to the standard. We believe that
even those in charge of a consulting group should be eligible for recusal if certain
safeguards are in place. We encourage the Board to consider a provision in ISB 2
acknowledging this based on the following safeguards.

In order to recuse himself or herself, a person in charge of a consulting group must be
able to appoint an “appropriate designee.’’ An appropriate designee would be an
individual who (1) has the requisite level of technical expertise, and (2) is capable of
making an objective and unbiased decision under the circumstances. In addition, we
recommend that a review be performed of all technical consultations that involved
designees. Such a review should be performed as part of a firm's annual quality control
inspection and as part of the firm's triennial peer review. The purpose of the review
would be to ensure that the designees had the requisite skills and expertise and reached
conclusions (bat reflected an appropriate level of objectivity.
Similar to the Employment With Audit Clients project, we expect that if a designee
knows that his or her work will be reviewed by those outside of the audit engagement and
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by members of another accounting firm, they will be more likely to apply a higher
standard of care to the work they perform and the decisions they make. In our view, this
additional review would have even more of a deterrent effect titan that described in
paragraph 23 of ISB 2. In that paragraph, the Board took comfort from the fact that an
auditor of certain funds in a fund complex would be less likely to cover up systemic
problems discovered during an audit because other funds in the complex subject to the
same system would be audited by another auditor.

1'hus, the last sentence of paragraph 20 of ISB 2 could be revised to read as follows.
On the other hand, professionals in a consulting department may be recused and
therefore not be subject to the standard’s restrictions if they in fact are not, and
will not be, involved in any way in (lie audit. When the person who recuses
himself or herself has direct management responsibility for the consulting
function, an appropriate designee is required. An appropriate designee is one who
possesses the requisite level of technical competence in the subject matter, and is
capable of rendering consulting advice under the circumstances in an objective
and impartial manner. Situations involving the use of designees should be subject
to review during the firm’s next annual internal inspection and its next triennial
peer review. Those reviews shall examine the appropriateness of the designee,
including his or her qualifications and whether the advice given by the designee
was appropriate in the circumstances. The principal benefit of this review is its
deterrent effect Designees are less likely to acquiesce to questionable client
proposals when they know that their advice will be subject to both internal (firm)
and external (peer review) scrutiny.
Definition ofMutual Funds

Paragraph 1 of ISB 2 reads as follows:

This Standard applies to the determination of auditor independence with respect
to audits of mutual funds and related entities which are subject to the
independence requirements of the SEC.
“Mutual funds” are defined in ISB 2 as investment companies subject to the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Accordingly, a private fund that is not registered with the SEC
and thus not subject to the ’40 Act (e.g., an off-shore, non-U.S. fund) would not be a
mutual fond for purposes of ISB 2. On that basis, paragraph 1 seems to indicate that ISB
2 does not apply to an auditor of an entity that is related to such a fond. However, the
ISB staff has staled that ISB 2 would apply despite the wording in paragraph 1. For
example, a private non-U.S. fond may be advised by a privately held non-U.S. investment
adviser which is owned by 3 non-U.S. subsidiary of a non-U.S SEC registrant (i.e., one
based outride the U,S. that files a Form 20-F with the SEC). Further, a non-U.S. auditor
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might audit the registrant, the private fund, and the private adviser. Even though the
registrant is not related to a fund covered by ISB 2 (because the fund is not a '40 Act
fund), according to the 1SB staff the non-U.S. auditor would in fact be subject to the
requirements of ISB 2.
This is not the answer one would get from a literal reading of paragraph 1 and we
question if this is consistent with the Board's intent, given that the funds in question do
not meet the definition of a mutual fund in the ISB 2 If the Board disagrees with the
staff, il should take this opportunity to consider what situations it intends to be covered
by ISB 2 and ensure that the provisions of ISB 2 are clear regarding scope and
applicability. If the Board agrees with the staff, then this issue may simply be the result
of unclear wording in paragraph 1. If so, this could be alleviated by amending the
definition of mutual funds, which we strongly encourage the Board to do, to ensure
consistency in the application of the standard.

*

*

*

We appreciate the opportunity to express our views and would be pleased to discuss them
with you in detail. If you have questions, please contact Robert H. Herz at (973) 2367217 or Kenneth E. Dakdduk at (201) 521-3048.

